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Rose: Shareholder Proposals in the Market for Corporate Influence

IS INJURY A TORTIOUS ACT?: INTERPRETING FLORIDA'S
LONG-ARM STATUTE
Cole Barnett
Abstract
Florida Statute § 48.193 enumerates several acts that grant Florida
courts personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. Under Florida
Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(2), nonresident defendants may become subject to
personal jurisdiction in Florida by "committing a tortious act within this
state." The Florida district courts of appeal are split over the correct
interpretation of this phrase. Along with the federal courts that sit in
Florida, the state's First and Third District Courts of Appeal broadly
interpret the phrase to reach nonresident defendants whose out-of-state acts
cause injury in Florida. In contrast, the state's Second, Fourth, and Fifth
District Courts of Appeal narrowly interpret the same language to exclude
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who cause injury in
Florida by acting outside of the state. The Florida Supreme Court and the
Florida Legislature have declined to resolve this split, providing the
opportunity for forum shopping when it is advantageous for plaintiffs to
avoid the narrow interpretation by filing in federal court. This Note argues
that the broad interpretation is preferable based upon canons of statutory
interpretation, the policy of providing Florida residents with an appropriate
forum to redress their harms, and the expansive reach of Florida's personal
jurisdiction statutory scheme.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 2302
1.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN FLORIDA AND THE SPLIT
OVER

II.

§ 48.193(1)(A)(2) .......................................................

2304

OTHER STATES' INTERPRETATIONS OF "COMMITTING

A TORTIOUs ACT WITHIN THIS STATE". ............................... 2308

ImI.

THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS PREFERABLE ..................... 2310

* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Florida Levin College of Law; B.A.S. 2011, St.
Petersburg College. I would like to thank the University of Florida Levin College of Law faculty,
particularly Professor Amy Mashburn who provided me with this topic and guided me through this
process. Thanks to Professors William Page and Leslie Knight for their help with reviewing drafts
of this Note. Additionally, thanks to Professors Jason Nance, Shamika Dalton, Loren Turner, and
Jennifer Wondracek for taking time out of their busy schedules. Very importantly, I thank Marc
Hernandez, my Note adviser. I express my gratitude to my wonderful wife Karla for embracing my
enthusiasm and tolerating the time I put into this project. Last, I would like to thank Lisa Caldwell,
Angelia Forder, Professor Dennis Calfee, and the student editors of the FloridaLaw Review for
their diligence, thorough feedback, and for being outstanding people.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 6 [2015], Art. 2
2302

FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

A.
B.

C.
D.

IV.

[Vol. 66

2310
"Tortious Act" is a Legal Term ofArt .......................
The Broad Interpretation Provides Florida
Residents and Businesses with an Appropriate
23 13
F orum ..............................................
The Whole-Text Canon Supports the Broad
2317
Interpretation.........................................
The Narrow Interpretationis Based on Flawed
23 19
R easoning...........................................

2321
How § 48.193(1)(A)(2) SHOULD BE AMENDED ...................

2322
C ON CLU SION ...................................................
INTRODUCTION

Statutory interpretation begins with the text itself,' but sometimes
seemingly clear text proves ambiguous. 2 For example, § 48.193(1)(a)(2) of
the Florida Statutes confers specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants based upon their "[c]ommitting a tortious act within this state."3
However, the phrase, "committing a tortious act within this state," is more
ambiguous than it appears. 4 Indeed two of Florida's District Courts of
Appeal (DCA)-the First and Third -as well as the United States District
Courts for the Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts of Florida and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit6 have interpreted
Florida caused by an outthe phrase broadly in ruling that an injury within
7
of-state act suffices to confer jurisdiction. In contrast, the state's Second,
Fourth, and Fifth DCAs have interpreted the phrase narrowly. 8 These
courts require the actions of nonresident defendants to occur within
1. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL

TEXTS Xxvii (2012).
2. The word "ambiguity" can be used to describe semantic ambiguity, syntactic ambiguity,
or used as "a catch-all phrase, referring to any uncertainty in statutory meaning." See WILLIAM D.
PoPKIN, A DICTIONARY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 11 (2007).
3. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(2) (2013). Please note that Florida Statutes § 48.193 was
recently renumbered in 2013, see 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-164 (C.S.S.B. 186) (West),
and that many cases discussed in this Note use the old numbering system in their text. See, e.g.,
Promex, LLC v. Perez Distrib. Fresno, Inc., 09-22285-CIV, 2010 WL 3452341 at *4 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 1, 2010) (using the old "(1)(b)" numbering system when referring to the newly renumbered
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2)).
4. See infra Section III.A (explaining that "tortious act" is a legal term of art that is
ambiguous and noting that multiple definitions of "tortious act" have been asserted including: a
substantial aspect of a tort; where the tort is completed; or where an injury occurs).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See, e.g., Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216 (1 th Cir. 1999) (holding that instate injury alone is enough under Florida Statutes § 48.193(1)(a)(2)).
8. See infra Part I.
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Florida's state boundaries in order to confer personal jurisdiction under
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). 9 The Florida Supreme Court has avoided the issue by
merely noting the split in footnotes.'
Resolving this split is important because the split incentivizes plaintiffs
to avoid the Second, Fourth, and Fifth DCAs by forum shopping and filing
in federal, rather than state court.1" For example, assume a nonresident
defendant commits an act outside Florida that injures a resident of
Florida's Fourth District. 12 Because Florida's Fourth DCA applies
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) narrowly, the court will find that it does not have
jurisdiction over the dispute. 13 However, if the plaintiff meets the amountin-controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332,14 the plaintiff can file the
claim in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida. 15 The Southern District will likely find that jurisdiction is proper
6
under § 48.193(l)(a)(2) because the court applies the broad interpretation.'
Part I of this Note introduces the two-step process that Florida courts
use to determine personal jurisdiction and describes the circuit split
regarding § 48.193(1)(a)(2). Part II provides a brief survey of other states
that have interpreted language similar to § 48.193(1)(a)(2) as a useful
comparison.1 7 Part 1 argues that, for three reasons, in-state injury alone is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction under § 48.193(l)(a)(2). First, the legal
term of art "tortious act" includes not only the act element of a tort but also
the injury element. Second, strong policy arguments favor interpreting
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) broadly. Third, the broad interpretation is consistent with
the expansive reach of § 48.193 and Florida's overall personal jurisdiction
statutory scheme. Part IV concludes that the Florida Legislature should
9. For example, the Second District Court of Appeal held that "[a]lthough the fact that an
injury occurs in Florida is crucial to a determination of when a cause of action accrued, the
occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not satisfy.... [§] 48.193[(1)(a)(2)]." Phillips
v. Orange Co., 522 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1988).
10. See, e.g., Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1206 n.6 (Fla. 2010);
Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1253 n.2 (Fla. 2002).
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
12. For a coherent analysis of why the Fourth District Court of Appeals applies
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) narrowly, see Thomas Jefferson University v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 4th 1998) (Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting).
13. See id. (stating that § 48.193(1)(a)(2) "should not be read to reach conduct in another
state that causes injury to someone in Florida").
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (the case must involve a claim in excess of $75,000 to meet the
amount in controversy requirement).
15. By definition, because § 48.193(l)(a)(2) is only applicable when a Florida resident sues a
nonresident defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 1332's diversity requirement will always be satisfied. See id.
16. For an example of where the Southern District applied § 4 8.193(l)(a)(2) broadly, see
DiMaggio, LLC. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
17. There are seven other "two-step" states that have interpreted either the same or
functionally equivalent language. Four of these states have interpreted such language broadly and
the other three states have interpreted it narrowly. This Note will provide data for states that use a
two-step process for determining personal jurisdiction. See infra Part II.
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redraft the provision using unambiguous language that clearly confers
jurisdiction when nonresident
defendants commit extraterritorial acts that
8
cause injury in Florida.'
I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN FLORIDA AND THE SPLIT OVER

§ 48.193(l)(A)(2)
Section 48.193 of the Florida Statutes enumerates acts that confer
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.19 The Florida Supreme Court has
held that Florida courts must engage in a "two-step" process when
applying § 48.193.20 In the first step, courts determine whether there are
"sufficient jurisdictional facts" alleged "to bring the action within the
ambit of [Florida's long-arm] statute.' If this threshold is met, the court
then determines in the second step whether the defendant has sufficient
"minimum contacts" with Florida to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process requirements. 22
Like other states that have an enumerated-act statute, Florida has
created two distinct categories of personal jurisdiction 23 -"specific" and
"general. 2 4 Section 48.193(1)(a) contains Florida's "specific"jurisdiction
provisions. These provisions are satisfied when a nonresident defendant
personally or through an agent commits one of the enumerated acts in
§ 48.193(1)(a) and a cause of action arises out of that act. Section
48.193(2), Florida's "general" jurisdiction provision, provides that a
nonresident "defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated
activity within this state ... is subject to the [general] jurisdiction of the
courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity."
Because § 48.193(1)(a)(2) is a specific jurisdiction provision, this Note
focuses on the specific jurisdiction context.
Under § 48.193(l)(a)(2), a nonresident defendant satisfies Florida's
18. This Note leaves open the question of whether the provision should be limited to
intentional torts. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382(6) (West 2013) (conferring jurisdiction
when a nonresident intentionally causes harm in Ohio by an act outside the state).
19. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (2013). Note that Florida courts do not apply § 48.193
retroactively. See Dane Ullian, Retroactive Applicationof State Long-Arm Statutes, 65 FLA. L. REV.
1653, 1667-69 (2013).
20. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 544 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989) ("The mere proof
of any one of the several circumstances enumerated in section 48.193 as the basis for obtaining
jurisdiction of nonresidents does not automatically satisfy the due process requirement of minimum
contacts. We do recognize, however, that implicit within several of the enumerated circumstances
are sufficient facts which if proven, without more, would suffice to meet the requirements of
InternationalShoe Co.").

21. Id.
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1) for the list of enumerated acts that may satisfy the first step in
obtaining specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See id. at § 48.193(2) for enumerated
acts that may satisfy the first step in obtaining general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
24. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945) (setting the foundation
for "specific" and "general" jurisdiction).
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long-arm statute by "[c]omitting a tortious act within this state." Florida's
DCAs are split over the correct interpretation of § 48.193(1)(a)(2).2 5 The
First and Third DCAs have held that an act or omission outside Florida that
causes an injury in Florida satisfies § 48.193(1)(a)(2).26 Florida's federal
28
courts-the Eleventh Circuit27 and the District Courts for the Northern,
Middle, 29 and Southern30 Districts-have also held that in-state injury
alone confers jurisdiction under § 48.193(l)(a)(2). This Note labels this
view the "broad interpretation." In contrast, Florida's Second,31 Fourth,3 2
and Fifth 33 DCAs require the nonresident defendant to commit the injurycausing act within Florida's physical boundaries to satisfy
§ 48.193(l)(a)(2). This Note labels this view the "narrow interpretation."
Florida's First DCA initially embraced the narrow interpretation, 34 but
subsequently adopted the broad interpretation in InternationalHarvester
Co. v. Mann.35 In InternationalHarvester,a stockholder from Florida sued
a nonresident for breach of fiduciary duty. 36 The First DCA reasoned that
25. See, e.g., Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1216-17 (1 th Cir. 1999) (noting the
split and stating that the Eleventh Circuit would accept whatever interpretation the Florida Supreme
Court adopted); Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 926 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1991)
(noting the split); Enviracarbon, Inc. v. Couch, 6: 10-CV- 1886-ORL-35DAB, 2011 WL4501058 at
*2 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011) (same); Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1206
n.6 (Fla. 2010) (same); Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1253 n.2 (Fla. 2002) (same); Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (Farmer, J., concurring and
dissenting) (same).
26. E.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Mann, 460 So. 2d 580, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1984)
(holding that the plaintiff needs to merely assert that an injury occurred in Florida); Wood v. Wall,
666 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1996) ("Because [defendants] are alleged to have
committed purposeful, non fortuitous, intentional tortious acts on [the plaintiff] located in Florida,
[the defendants] are deemed to have subjected themselves to the long-ann jurisdiction of Florida
courts ... ").

27. See Posner, 178 F.3dat 1216.
28. See Mainline Info. Sys., Inc. v. Fordham, 4-1 1-CV-137-SPM-WCS, 2011 WL2038692,
at *1, *4-5 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2011).
29. See Enviracarbon,2011 WL 4501058, at *2-3.
30. See DiMaggio, LLC. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (S.D.
Fla. 2000).
31. See Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1988) ("Although
the fact that an injury occurs in Florida is crucial to a determination of when a cause of action
accrued, the occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not
satisfy ... 48.193[(1)(a)(2)].").

32. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting).
33. See Deloitte & Touche v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 929 So. 2d 678, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
5th 2006).
34. Jack Pickard Dodge, Inc. v. Yarbrough, 352 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st
1977) (rejecting the broad interpretation in a negligence case where the nonresident defendant
"committed no act in Florida").
35. 460 So. 2d 580, 581 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1984).
36. Id.
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the plaintiff had asserted an injury that "occurred within Florida."37 The
court held that "[i]t is well-established that the commission of a tort for
purposes of establishing long-arm jurisdiction does not require physical
entry into38the state, but merely requires that the place of injury be within
Florida.,
Florida's Third DCA has also espoused the broad interpretation. In
Wood v. Wall,39 a Florida attorney entered into a partnership with
nonresidents to purchase property in Pennsylvania. 40 The Florida attorney
filed suit when two nonresident partners "personally purchased property
and ultimately transferred it to the established partnership at an undisclosed
profit. '41 The Third DCA upheld personal jurisdiction under
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) even though the defendants did not commit an act within
Florida.42
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also adopted the broad
interpretation of § 48.193(1)(a)(2), following the lead of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before it split to form the Eleventh Circuit.43
Florida's Northern, Middle, and Southern Districts followed the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation. 44 These federal courts have applied the broad
interpretation in various contexts: negligent estate planning,45 shareholder
37. Id.
38. Id. at 582. For an intentional tort example, see Allerton v. State Dept. of Ins., 635 So. 2d
36, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1994).
39. 666 So. 2d 984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 1996).
40. Id. at 985.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 986 (citing Int'l Harvester,460 So. 2d at 581). But see Casita, L.P. v. Maplewood
Equity Partners L.P., 960 So. 2d 854, 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d 2007) ("[Section 48.193(1)(a)(2)]
expressly requires that the tort [of defamation] be committed in Florida. Under Florida law, the tort
of defamation is committed in the place where it is published.").
43. "[T]his court's predecessor held that jurisdiction under § 48.193[(1)(a)(2)] 'was not
limited to a situation where an act in Florida caused an injury in Florida but also.., reached the
situation where a foreign tortious act caused injury in Florida."' Sun Bank, N.A. v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 926 F.2d 1030, 1033-34 (1 th Cir. 1991) (quoting Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Universal
Marine Co., 543 F.2d 1107, 1109 (5th Cir. 1976) (citing Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d
1208, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1975))); see also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1 th
Cir. 1981) (ruling that the new Eleventh Circuit will follow the precedents established by the Fifth
Circuit in order to create a stable and predictable new circuit court). The Eleventh Circuit has been
inconsistent, but perhaps the application of personal jurisdiction is different when the act occurs in
a foreign country. Compare Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V.,
701 F.2d 889, 894 (11 th Cir. 1983) (denying personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
where the alleged actions occurred in the Netherlands), with Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
1209, 1216 (11 th Cir. 1999) (holding that in-state injury alone is sufficient).
44. See Mainline Info. Sys., Inc. v. Fordham, 4-1 1-CV-137-SPM-WCS, 2011 WL 2038692,
at *4 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2011); Enviracarbon, Inc. v. Couch, 6:10-CV-1886-ORL-35DAB, 2011
WL 4501058 at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011); DiMaggio, LLC. V. City & Cnty. Of San
Francisco, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
45. See Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253,255-56 (11 th Cir. 1996) (involving
a will that was negligently prepared in Michigan).
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suits,46 professional negligence and breach of contract, 47 breach of

fiduciary duty 48 trademark infringement
and unfair competition, 49 and
50
business.
with
tortious interference
In contrast, Florida's Second, 5 1 Fourth, 52 and Fifth5 3 DCAs have held

that in-state injury alone does not satisfy § 48.193(l)(a)(2). Comparing a
Fifth DCA case with a similar case from the Middle District of Florida
exemplifies this split. In Freedom Savings & Loan Ass 'n v. Ormandy &
Associates, Inc.,5 the Fifth DCA held that a tortious interference with
business claim was not a "tortious act" within Florida because the
defendant's act of wrongfully revoking a letter of credit "occurred in
Pennsylvania. 55 Contrarily, in Enviracarbon,Inc. v. Couch,56 the Middle
District held that a nonresident's alleged tortious interference "with an
advantageous business relationship" by soliciting-outside the state46. See, e.g., Posner, 178 F.3d 1213, 1216 (describing a shareholder suit involving defendant
corporations from Maryland and Pennsylvania and minority shareholders from Florida). However,
this suit was dismissed for lack of injury. Id. at 1219-20.
47. See Kim v. Keenan, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233-34 (M.D. Fla. 1999) (upholding personal
jurisdiction over Georgia lawyers in Florida court when the alleged negligent misrepresentation and
breach of contract between the lawyers and the plaintiff occurred in Georgia).
48. See Mehlenbacher ex rel. Asconi Corp. v. Jitaru, 6:04CV1118ORL-22KRS, 2005 WL
4585859, at *1, *11 (M.D. Fla. June 6,2005) (finding the court could assert jurisdiction where the
shareholders injured were Florida residents, the directors were from other states or foreign
countries, and the alleged fiduciary breaches occurred outside of Florida).
49. See Promex, LLC v. Perez Distrib. Fresno, Inc., 09-22285-CIV, 2010 WL 3452341, at *1,
*5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2010) ("The alleged injury of consumer confusion occurs in Florida, when
customers buy Defendant's products under the mistaken belief that they are buying Plaintiff's
product. Thus... Defendant allegedly committed a tortious act outside the state that causes injury
in Florida and is, therefore, subject to Florida's Long-Arm Statute under Section
48.193 [(1)(a)(2)].").
50. See Mainline Info. Sys., Inc. v. Fordham, 4-11-CV-137-SPM-WCS, 2011 WL2038692,
at *1, *4--5 (N.D. Fla. May 24,2011) (describing facts where a nonresident defendant attempted to
lure employees away from a Florida corporation).
51. E.g., Phillips v. Orange Co., 522 So. 2d 64,66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1988) ("Although
the fact that an injury occurs in Florida is crucial to a determination of when a cause of action
accrued, the occurrence of the injury alone in the forum state does not satisfy . . . section
48.193[(1)(a)(2)].").
52. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Compare Judy A. Clausen, Beware-Florida'sLong Arms Can Reach Through
Cyberspace and Grab Unsuspecting Professionals: []PersonalJurisdiction in Professional
MalpracticeCases, 10 FLA. COAsTAL L.J. 505, 512-13 (2009) (stating that the Fifth DCA embraces
the broad interpretation by citing to Deloitte & Touche v. GencorIndustries,Inc., 929 So. 2d 678,
680-81, 683 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 2006)), with Deloitte, 929 So. 2d at 682 (stating that "in order
for jurisdiction to be based on the commission of a tortious act in Florida, Florida law does require,
at a minimum, that the misrepresentation was made in the State of Florida").
54. 479 So. 2d 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 1985).
55. Id. at 316-17.
56. 6:10-CV-1886-ORL-35DAB, 2011 WL 4501058 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2011).
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potential clients for his own benefit satisfied § 48.193(1)(a)(2).57 The
Enviracarbon court noted that it had 58"consistently applied a broad
construction of this statutory provision.,
II. OTHER STATES' INTERPRETATIONS OF "COMMITrING A
TORTIous ACT WITHIN THIS STATE"

Seventeen other states-like Florida-have enacted enumerated-act
long-arm statutes and embraced a two-step approach to determine personal
jurisdiction. 59 Seven of these seventeen two-step states use the same
language or a functional equivalent to the language used in
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2).60 For the purposes of this Note, a provision will be
considered functionally equivalent only if it deviates from
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2)'s exact wording in a manner that does not affect whether
the broad or narrow interpretation is controlling. 6 1 The table below displays
how these seven states with functionally equivalent language have
interpreted their provisions. Four of the states with functionally equivalent
language have adopted a broad interpretation
while the other three states
62
interpretation.
narrow
a
adopted
have

57. Id.at *1-3.
58. Id. at *2.
59. The states are Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-Arm Statutes
Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. REV.491, 525-26 (2004) (documenting the
current personal jurisdiction landscape by citing both the long-arm statutes and supreme court cases
of these states).
60. Seven of the seventeen two-step states avoided Florida's problem by not using the
"tortious act" language. They do not have a provision that is the same or functionally equivalent to
§ 48.193(l)(a)(2). These states are Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4) (2013). Montana, Michigan, and
Mississippi have provisions that seem to invite the broad interpretation. See, e.g., MONT.R. Civ. P
4(b)(1)(B) (2013) (stating that Montana courts will have jurisdiction over the "commission of any
act resulting in accrual within Montana of a tort action"). All three statutes have been interpreted
broadly. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kroll, Pomerantz & Cameron, 724 P.2d 717, 721 (Mont. 1986)
(adopting the broad interpretation approach). Ohio is an outlier with a provision that explicitly
allows in-state injury to suffice in three specific circumstances. See OmIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.382(4), (6)-(7) (West 2013).
61. One example of a functionally equivalent provision is when a statute contains the same
language as § 48.193(l)(a)(2), but then adds a limited defamation exception. E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R
§ 302(a)(2). Also functionally equivalent are provisions that assert jurisdiction based on "a tortious
act or omission within this state." E.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 9-10-91(2) (2013) (emphasis added).
Provisions are not functionally equivalent if they omit "committing a tortious act within this state"
entirely, or ifthe word "act" is separated from the word "tortious." See, e.g., OHIO REV.CODE ANN.
§ 2307.382(6)-(7); § 2307.382(3) ("Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this
state ...").
62. The states with a broad interpretation are Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, and New Mexico. The
states with a narrow interpretation are Connecticut, Georgia, and New York. See Table infra.
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Narrow v. Broad
Other States' Interpretations of "Committing a Tortious Act Within
this State"
Statute

Language

CONN. GEN. STAT.

[C]ommits a
tortious act
within the state,

State

Connecticut

§ 52-59(b)(a)(2)
(2013)

Georgia

GA. CODE ANN.

§ 9-10-91(2) (2013)

Hawaii

Idaho

(2013)

State.

IDAHO CODE ANN.

[C]ommission
of a tortious act
within this state.

Extraterritorial acts satisfy the statute.
Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am.,
Combustion Control Div., 454 P.2d 63,

[C]ommission
of a tortious act
within this state.

65 (Idaho 1969).
Extraterritorial acts satisfy the statute.
State ex rel. William Ranni Assocs.,
Inc., v. Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d 134,

MO. REV. STAT.

§ 506.500.1(3)
N.M. STAT. ANN.

§ 38-1-16(A)(3)

N.Y. C.P.L.R.

§ 302(a)(2)
(McKinney 2013)

Extraterritorial acts satisfy the statute.
Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 569
(Haw. 1975).

135-36, 139 (Mo. 1987).
[C]ommission
of a tortious act
within this state.

Extraterritorial acts satisfy statute.
Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese of
Norwich, 48 P.3d 50, 54-55 (N.M.
2002).

(2013)
New York

Extraterritorial acts do not satisfy the
statute. Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513,
514 (Ga. 1987).

§ 634-35(a)(2)

HAW. REV. STAT.

(2013)
New Mexico

extraterritorial acts do not satisfy the
statute. See Osso v. Marc Auto., Inc.,
AANCV126009636, 2013 WL
3871437 at *4, *5 (Conn. Super. Ct.
July 2, 2013).

this state,
except as to a
cause of action
for defamation
of character
arising from the
act.
[C]ommission
of a tortious act
within this

§ 5-514(b) (2013)
Missouri

except as to a
cause of action
for defamation
of character
arising from the
act.
Commits a
tortious act or
omission within

Interpretation
The issue is currently unresolved by
Connecticut's highest court, but an
intermediate-level court has held that

[C]ommits a
tortious act
within the state,

Extraterritorial acts do not satisfy the
statute. Longines-Wittnauer Watch
Co.v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209

except as to a
cause of action
for defamation
of character
arising from the
act.

N.E.2d 68, 77 (N.Y. 1965).
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11. THE BROAD INTERPRETATION IS PREFERABLE
This Part proposes that § 48.193(1)(a)(2) should be interpreted broadly

for three reasons. First, "tortious act" is a legal term of art that
encompasses an injury caused by a physical act. Second, the broad
interpretation provides Florida residents and businesses with an appropriate
forum to redress their injuries. In contrast, the narrow interpretation
extends more due process protection to defendants than the U.S.
Constitution requires, though there is no evidence the legislature intended
§ 48.193(l)(a)(2) to create this result. Third, the broad interpretation is
consistent with Florida's broad personal jurisdiction statutory scheme. This
Part also addresses the following two lingering arguments used to support

the narrow interpretation: (1) that the Florida Supreme Court has already
resolved this issue in favor of the narrow interpretation; and (2) that a strict
construction rule supports the narrow interpretation.
A. "Tortious Act" is a Legal Term ofArt

The correct reading of the term "tortious act' 63 is a technical reading,
not a "plain reading." 64 Normally, when engaging in statutory
interpretation, courts should give words "their ordinary, everyday
meanings. ' ' 6 5 But the term "tortious act" is ambiguous. 6 6 The adjectival
modifier "tortious" creates the ambiguity. 67 Without the modifier
"tortious," the noun "act" clearly means "[s]omething done or performed"
or "[tihe process of doing or performing.

68

Yet, when the adjective

"tortious" is added to the word "act," readers have reason to disagree as to
whether the phrase means a substantial aspect of a tort,6 9 where the tort is
63. The word "tortious" is an adjective defined as either "[c]onstituting a tort; wrongful" or
"[i]n the nature of a tort." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1627 (9th ed. 2009). The word "act" is a noun
defined as "[s]omething done or performed" or "[tihe process of doing or performing; an
occurrence that results from a person's will being exerted on the external world." Id. at 27. The term
"tortious act" is defined as "[a]n act that subjects the actor to liability under the principles of tort
law." Id. at 28.
64. Contra Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 70-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th
1998) (Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) (reasoning that the plain reading of§ 48.193(1)(a)(2)
points to the narrow interpretation "[a]s the statutory text of[(1)[(a)(2)] itself indicates, jurisdiction
turns on the commission of a tortious act within this state" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. See generallySCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 69-77.
66. Most likely, the term is semantically ambiguous. See POPKIN, supra note 2, at 238-39
("Semantic ambiguity occurs when a word [or phrase has] two clearly divergent meanings, based on
different contexts. For example, a monarch can be a ruler or a butterfly; a ruler can be a measuring
device or a monarch.").
67. Provisions that use "act" without the modifier "tortious" do not create the semantic
ambiguity found in § 48.193(l)(a)(2). See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(6) (2013).
68. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 63, at 27.
69. See New Lenox Indus., Inc. v. Fenton, 510 F. Supp. 2d 893, 902 (M.D. Fla. 2007).
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771
completed,7 ° where
an injury occurs," or performing an act that results in a
tort.
To determine whether a technical or a plain interpretation is
appropriate, "context [may] indicate[] that a technical meaning applies"
when an ordinary phrase is used as a term of art.72 While the word "act"
has an obvious everyday meaning, when combined with the adjective
"tortious," the words create the legal term of art "tortious act." 73 When
dealing with terms of art, the ordinary legal meaning trumps the ordinary
everyday meaning7 4 : "[T]he technical [legal] meaning should75be favored
because that was probably what the legislature had in mind.,
Because the word "tortious" significantly alters the meaning of the
word "act," "tortious act" is a legal term of art that has a far different
meaning than a mere physical act or omission. Indeed, torts are often
broken down into multiple elements. For example, negligence-based torts
generally require the plaintiff to prove duty, breach, cause, and injury.76 To
demonstrate how a tort can be broken down into elements, assume a
Georgia resident stands on the Georgia side of the Florida-Georgia border.
The Georgia resident then throws a ball over the border committing a
battery when the ball hits a Florida resident. 77 The act element of the
battery is the physical act of throwing the ball.78 Because a battery also
requires a harmful contact or injury, 79 the injury suffered by the plaintiff is
a necessary part of the action that triggers legal liability. 0 In fact, a

70. See State ex. rel. William Ranni Assocs., Inc. v. Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Mo.
1987).
71. See Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 569 (Haw. 1975).
72. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 73. See City of Tampa v. Thatcher Glass Corp., 445
So. 2d 578, 579 n.2 (Fla. 1984); ANNE RUTLEDGE, BASIC LEGAL DRAFTnNG 20 (2012) ("A legal term
of art is a word or phrase that has a very specific, particular, sometimes technical meaning ....
").
We must look past the plain reading and use other methods of interpretation to determine the proper
meaning of an ambiguous phrase like "tortious act." See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So. 2d 956, 958
(Fla. 1993); RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE

SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 104-05 (2d ed. 2011).
73. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 63 and accompanying text (defining the words
"act," "tortious," and the term "tortious act").
74. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that legal terms of art should be expected
to have technical meaning and using the legal term "person" as an example where the ordinary
meaning differs from the "technical-meaning exception").
75. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 72, at 109.
76. E.g., RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 6 cmt. b, at 6768 (2010) (discussing the five elements of negligence: duty, failure to exercise reasonable care,
factual cause, physical harm, and harm within the scope of liability).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13, at 25 (1965) (defining the elements of
battery).
78. See id.
79. See id. § 13(a), at 25 (a battery requires "a harmful or offensive contact").
80. See id.
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81
physical act does not become "tortious" until the act causes an injury.
Therefore, because "tortious act" has a broader meaning than the word
"act," the injury element-just like the physical act of throwing the ballshould be considered part of a "tortious act." 82 Indeed, four other states
have correctly
reasoned that the term "tortious act" encompasses the injury
83
element.
In contrast, under the narrow interpretation, courts have reasoned that
"tortious" only means wrongful and that "act" is the operative word in
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). 84 But the adjective "tortious" modifies the noun "act" by
requiring the plaintiff to plead all of the elements of a tort to confer
jurisdiction.8 5 Therefore, § 48.193(1)(a)(2) is distinguishable from other
provisions that do not use the modifier "tortious." 86 Moreover, focusing on
the word "act" is improper because many cases are more complex than the
battery-across-the-state-line illustration used above. 87 Separating the
defendant's act from the injury element in the realms of business
interference,8 8 trademark infringement,8 9 and breach of fiduciary duty

81. See, e.g., id. § 13(b), at 25 (noting that a physical act becomes a battery if there is "a
harmful contact with the person").
82. See, e.g., New Lenox Indus., Inc. v. Fenton, 510 F. Supp. 2d 893, 902 (M.D. Fla 1993)
("[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate that the nonresident defendant committed a substantial aspect of
the alleged tort in Florida .

. .

. The tortious act does not have to take place in Florida, but a

substantial aspect would include the situation in which a foreign tortious act causes injury within
the forum." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
83. One of those states is New Mexico. See Tercero v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Norwich,
48 P.3d 50, 54-55 (N.M. 2002) (citing solely to its court of appeals as support for the broad
interpretation). The court of appeals cited the reasoning from the Illinois case Grey v. American
Radiator,stating that a tort occurs where an "event takes place which is necessary to render the
actor liable." Roberts v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 670 P.2d 974, 977 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting
Grey v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961)). The other
three states that have applied similar reasoning are Hawaii, Idaho, and Missouri. See Kailieha v.
Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 569 (Haw. 1975); Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div.,
454 P.2d 63, 65 (Idaho 1969); State ex rel. William Ranni Assocs., Inc., v. Hartenbach, 742 S.W.2d
134, 135-36, 139 (Mo. 1987) (stating that the "[c]ommission of a tortious act within this state
includes extraterritorial acts of negligence producing actionable consequences in Missouri").
84. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasizing the word "act" in the term "tortious act").
85. See id. at 71 ("[T]he person invoking jurisdiction under such statutes has the burden of
proving facts which clearly justify the use of that method of service of process.").
86. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(6) (2013) (using the word "act" without the word
"tortious").

87. For example, even a simple negligence claim includes the complex element of
foreseeability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3, at 25 (1965).

88. See Mainline Info. Sys., Inc. v. Fordham, 4-1 1-CV-137-SPM-WCS, 2011 WL 2038692,
at *4-5 (N.D. Fla. May 24, 2011) (applying the broad interpretation to a business relationship
interference case).
89. See Promex, LLC v. Perez Distrib. Fresno, Inc., 09-22285-CIV, 2010 WL 3452341, at *1,
*5 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2010) (applying the broad interpretation to a complex suit involving many
claims including trademark infringement).
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suits 9° is more difficult than in a simple battery where the physical act and
the injury are easily discernible by the naked eye. For example, a
defamatory internet posting made outside of Florida is not considered a
"tortious act" within the state until the website is accessed in Florida, the
location where the injury occurs.91 For another example, consider that

trademark infringement, which causes consumer confusion in Florida, may
not be an "act" in Florida.92 But the infringement is still considered a
"tortious act" because the infringement causes injury in Florida. 93 Due to
the difficulty of locating the defendant's act in complex cases and then
distinguishing that act from the injury, courts should adopt the broad
interpretation and read § 48.193(l)(a)(2)
to encompass in-state injuries
94
caused by out-of-state acts.
B. The BroadInterpretationProvides FloridaResidents and
Businesses with an AppropriateForum

Like most two-step states, Florida initially adopted a version of the
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03 , which was
embodied in Florida Statutes § 48.18296 and later replaced by § 48.193. 97
Section 48.182 was Florida's first general service of process statute
regarding nonresident defendants. 98 The statute responded to the increased
possibility of "compensable wrongful acts committed outside [Florida] by
nonresidents." 99 The Florida Legislature structured. the language of

90. See Mehlenbacher ex rel. Asconi Corp. v. Jitaru, 6:04CV1 1 18ORL-22KRS, 2005 WL
4585859, *1-2, *11-12 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2005) (applying the broad interpretation to a breach of
fiduciary duty suit).
91. See Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1216 (Fla. 2010).
92. See Promex, 2010 WL 3452341, at *5.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Kailieha v. Hayes, 536 P.2d 568, 569 (Haw. 1975).
95. See W.C. Gentry, In PersonamJurisdiction-DueProcess andFlorida'sShort "LongArm," 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 336, 343-44 & n.63 (1971) (discussing how states implemented the
"commission of a tortious act within the state" language borrowed from § 1.03(3) of the Uniform
Interstate and International Procedure Act).
96. FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1971), repealed by FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1973).
97. FLA. STAT. § 48.193; see also H.B. 1486, 1973 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1973). The Florida
Legislature enacted § 48.193 in 1973 and has amended it five times. See 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
Ch. 84-2 (West); 1988 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 88-176 (West); 1993 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 93250 (C.S.H.B. 1159) (West); 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 95-147 (S.B. 596) (West); 2013 Fla.
Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-164 (C.S.S.B. 186) (West). Only the 2013 amendment affected
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) by merely changing the numbering system, turning § 48.193(1)(b) into
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2). See 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-164 (C.S.S.B. 186) (West). Like most
states, Florida's long-arm statute evolved in response to InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945). See Gentry, supra note 95, at 343-44.
98. 1970 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 70-90 (S.B. 255) (West).
99. Id.
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§ 48.182 similar to that of § 48.193(1)(a)(6).' 00 The drafters geared
§ 48.182 toward the product liability context,' 0 ' and there is evidence that
10 2
the legislature intended § 48.182 to reach the limits of due process.
Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) repealed § 48.182 in 1973.103
This small amount of legislative history for § 48.182 is not useful in
determining the legislative intent behind § 48.193(1)(a)(2). The relevant
senate bills, house bills, and session laws provide no further guidance for
interpreting § 48.193(1)(a)(2).10 4 In addition, scholars have questioned
statutory interpretation's value as a tool for discovering legislative intent
because statutes are often
"drafted by multiple persons, often with
0 5
objectives."'
conflicting
Still, some courts have suggested that the legislature intended
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) to be interpreted narrowly.106 First, these courts reason
that because the legislature did not draft § 48.193(1)(a)(2) to read
"commission of a tort in this state," the legislature intended the narrow
interpretation. 107 However, when statutory language is ambiguous, the
"plain language of a statute is not the 'best evidence' of legislative
intent." 10 8 Indeed, one court has reasoned that the broad interpretation is
'0 9
correct based on a plain reading of "commission of a tortious act."'
Implicit in the reasoning behind the narrow interpretation is that the
100. See FLA. STAT. § 48.182 (1971), repealed by FLA. STAT. § 48.193 (1973) (allowing
service of process over nonresident defendants whose acts outside of Florida cause injury in
Florida, but with certain qualifications like that of § 48.193(1)(a)(6) (2013) and also a defamation
exception).
101. See Gentry, supra note 95, at 357 (noting that "enunciated legislative intent suggests that
[§ 48.182] aims primarily at providing in personamjurisdiction in product liability suits" (footnote
omitted)).
102. See S.B. 255, 1970 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1970) (Senator de la Parte) ("[T]he legislature
intends that the courts of this state shall have personal jurisdiction over such nonresidents for
wrongful acts committed outside the state which causes injury, loss, or damage to persons within
Florida to the extent due process considerationspermit .. ") (emphasis added).
103. See H.B. 1486, 1973 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1973).
104. See S.B. 886, 1973 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1973) (stating § 48.193 provides "for personal
service of process outside the state under certain circumstances; repealing § 48.182" and provides a
new long arm statute dealing with acts committed by resident or nonresidents within or outside the
state); H.B. 1486, 1973 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1973) (same).
105. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 392 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does
Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 441,446-47 (1990)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). A statute's language may be a product of compromise between competing purposes that
create statutory ambiguity. See RICHARD MICHAEL FiscHL & JEREMY PAUL, GETrING TO MAYBE:
How TO EXCEL ON LAW SCHOOL ExAMs 43-46 (1999).

106. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting).
107. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 397.

109. See Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div., 454 P.2d 63, 65 (Idaho
1969) (describing the broad interpretation as "logical").
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Florida Legislature intended the narrow interpretation because the
legislature adopted an enumerated-act statute without a provision that
extends the statute to the limits of due process.1 0 Yet, in the context of an
out-of-state act that causes in-state injury, the legislature's adoption of an
enumerated-act long-arm statute-not interpreted to the limits of due
process--does not prove that the legislature intended to offer nonresident
defendants more constitutional protection than required."1
Therefore, absent clear legislative intent to the contrary, the broad
interpretation is preferable on policy grounds because Florida's "long-arm
statutes [should] protect its residents and allow them to seek redress
against nonresidents who do them harm."' 12 Thus, courts should broadly
interpret § 48.193(1)(a)(2) so all Florida residents and businesses harmed
by a tortious act can file suit in Florida.
Under the narrow interpretation, some courts will dismiss cases in the
first step even though those cases may be constitutional. For example, in
the intentional tort context, under the Calderv. Jones 13 "effects test," the
U.S. Constitution may permit courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
110. For a discussion of the states that have an enumerated-act statute or court rule with a "to
the limits" provision, see McFarland, supra note 59, at 529-31.
11. A survey of states that have both an enumerated-act statute and a "to the limits" clause
shows that the choice to allow in-state injury alone, caused by an out-of-state act, to be a basis for
personal jurisdiction is independent from the choice to add a "to the limits" provision. Maine
explicitly allows in-state injury to suffice along with adopting a "to the limits" provision. See ME.
REv. STAT. tit. 14, § 704-A(2)(b) (2013). In contrast, Alaska and Nebraska both have a "to the
limits" provision, yet neither provide room for the broad interpretation. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.05.015(a)(3), (c) (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-536(l)(c), (2) (2013). In further contrast,
Illinois, South Dakota, and Tennessee use ambiguous language that could be interpreted broadly or
narrowly, but still have a "to the limits" provision. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (a)(2), (c)
(2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-7-2(2), (14) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(2), (6)
(2013).
112. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, ExtraterritorialPersonalJurisdictionfor the
Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizingthe TypicalLong-Arm Statute to Codify and
Refine International Shoe After Its FirstSixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 339,347 (2007). For
a discussion of the ability of long-arm statutes to protect a state's residents and businesses, see id.
In
their Article, Professors Detta and Kapoor note that:
In addition to wanting such long-arm statutes, states need them in order to protect
their residents and allow them to seek redress against nonresidents who do them
harm ....'[T]he foundations ofjurisdiction include the interest that a State has in
providing redress in its own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or
otherwise incur obligations to, those within the ambit of the State's legitimate
protective policy.' Such a long-arm statute can also create a better environment for
businesses (especially smaller businesses) in the state as they tend to minimize
costs from having to pursue out-of-state legal actions that could otherwise be
pursued within the state.
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ill. 1957)).
113. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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nonresident defendants for out-of-state acts (at least with intentional torts
like defamation) that cause a foreseeable injury in the forum state. 114 While
some courts have criticized and narrowly construed the "effects test,"' 1 5 the
test's use is common and growing.' 6 Section lIIA's ball-throwing
hypothetical-where a resident of Georgia stands in Georgia and throws a
ball at a victim in Florida-exemplifies an intentional-tort effects-test case.
Under the narrow interpretation, courts would dismiss the suit in the first
step because the nonresident defendant did not commit an act in Florida." 7
Yet, under the effects test, personal jurisdiction would likely be
constitutional as the nonresident "targeted" ' 1 8 a Florida resident,
"intended" 119 harmful effects to occur in Florida, and therefore,
"purposefully availed" himself of the forum. 120 The narrow interpretation
prevents Florida courts from conferring jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants who harm Florida residents and businesses. Thus, the broad
interpretation is preferable on policy grounds.
114. Id. at 788-90 (holding that personal jurisdiction based on an intentional tort not
performed in the state is constitutional where the harm is foreseeable); see C. Douglas Floyd &
Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of PersonalJurisdictionin an Era of Widely
Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purposeand Effects, 81 IND. L.J. 601, 615 (2006) ("[C]ourts
have applied Calder to cases alleging intentional torts other than defamation .... includ[ing]
trademark infringement, RICO violations, misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition,
trademark dilution, tortious interference with contract, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.").
115. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (requiring defendant to "target" the forum in question under the stream-of-commerce
theory to satisfy the effects test); Sabados v. Planned Parenthood of Greater Ind., 882 N.E.2d 12 1,
127 n.4 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) ("Calderis limited by its facts and has been consistently criticized.").
116. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal
Jurisdiction,45 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 1301, 1304 n.9 (2012) (comparing the growth of stream-ofcommerce cases to the growth of effects-test cases and finding that "there were approximately 94
stream-of-commerce cases between 1997 and 2000, as compared to 77 effects-test cases," and that
"[a] decade later, between 2007 and 2010, the number of stream-of-commerce cases had grown to
167-but the number of effects-test cases had grown to 294").
117. Assuming just these limited facts, there are no other provisions under § 48.193 that cover
this type of act. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a) (2013).
118. While the "targeted" language was used under the stream-of-commerce theory in J.
McIntyre, the tort in this example was not "mere untargeted negligence" but "[riather ... intentional,
at a Florida resident. See Calder, 465 U.S. at
and allegedly tortious, action.., expressly aimed.
789.
119. We can assume this defendant intended to harm the victim for the purposes of the
hypothetical. This is probably a step beyond the facts in Calder. In Calder, the defendants
themselves had not placed the libelous article in circulation in California. Id. In this hypothetical,
the defendant is directly responsible for the harmful effects in Florida; he placed the harm-causing
instrument (the ball) into Florida himself. Thus, the defendant is the "primary participant[] in an
alleged wrongdoing intentionally directed" at the Florida resident. See id. at 790.
120. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,253 (1958) (setting forth the purposeful availment
requirement); Floyd & Baradaran-Robison, supra note 114, at 612 ("[S]ome post-Calderpersonal
jurisdiction cases have treated the effects test as an alternative way to establish purposeful
availment.").
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C. The Whole-Text Canon Supports the BroadInterpretation
When taken as a whole,'12 Florida's long-arm statutes create a tight
personal-jurisdiction mesh with several overlapping provisions. 2 2 In
addition to § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Florida Statutes § 48.193 contains other
specific personal jurisdiction provisions. 123 For example, § 48.193(1)(a)(8)

confers jurisdiction in paternity proceedings if the person engaged in
intercourse while in Florida. In addition to § 48.193, Florida has other
long-arm statutes that cover nonresidents. 124 For example, § 48.171 confers

jurisdiction over nonresident motorists. Therefore, Florida's long-arm
statutes provide Florida residents and businesses with a forum to litigate
126
their harms in numerous contexts.125 However,while overlaps may exist,

some jurisdictional gaps remain.
Importantly, § 48.193(1)(a)(2) serves to close one substantial gap left
open by § 48.193(1)(a)(6). Section 48.193(1)(a)(6) provides specific

jurisdiction over nonresident defendants for causes of action arising from
their out-of-state acts that cause injury to persons or property in Florida in
two circumstances. Section 48.193(1)(a)(6)(a) is satisfied if, at or around

the time of injury, "[t]he defendant was engaged in solicitation or service
activities within this state"'' 27 or if "[p]roduct, materials, or things
processed, serviced, or manufactured by the defendant anywhere were used
or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or

121. The whole-text canon "requires the interpreter to consider the whole text of a statute in
order to determine statutory meaning." POPKIN, supra note 2, at 281. "The point of [the whole
statute] maxim is that no part of the statute should be interpreted in isolation from the rest of the
statute." BROWN & BROWN, supra note 72, at 104-05.
122. See generally Marc Rohr, Personal Jurisdiction in Florida: Some Problems and
Proposals, 5 NOVA L.J. 365, 366-77 (1981) (setting out Florida's personal jurisdiction statutory
scheme and noting several overlapping provisions).

123. These provisions provide personal jurisdiction for various acts, such as: business
ventures; mortgaging real property in Florida; insuring a person or property located in Florida at the
time of contracting; marriage dissolution regarding actions for alimony, child support, or division of
property; injuries to persons or property in Florida for acts or omissions outside of Florida if certain
conditions are met; breach of contract within Florida or failure to perform contracted acts within
Florida; and, forming a contract where Florida is the chosen forum. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)
(2013).
124. Other sections cover nonresidents who engage in business in the state and who operate
aircraft or watercraft in Florida. Id. §§ 48.181, 48.19.
125. For a general discussion of how long-arm statutes can protect a forum's residents and
businesses, see supra note 112.
126. Plaintiffs usually plead that jurisdiction is proper under several provisions and overlap is
common. See, e.g., Promex, LLC v. Perez Distrib. Fresno, Inc., 09-22285-CIV, 2010 WL 3452341,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 1, 2010) ("Plaintiff alleges personal jurisdiction against Defendant based on
Florida Statute Sections 48.193(1)(a), (b), and (2) arguing for both specific and general
jurisdiction."); Rohr, supra note 122, at 371 (noting the "substantial[] overlapping coverage of
§ 48.193").
127. FLA. STAT. § 48.193(l)(a)(6)(a).
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use. ' 12 8 Section 48.193(1)(a)(6)(b) enumerates product liability actions,
just as its predecessor § 48.182 did. 129 Section 48.193(1)(a)(6) reserves to
§ 48.193(l)(a)(2) all specific personal jurisdiction where the nonresident
defendant does not engage in any business or does not perform services in
Florida. 130 Given § 48.193(1)(a)(6)'s broad context covering any injury to
people or property arising out of a party's solicitation, service, or supply of
products in Florida, 131 the narrow interpretation of § 48.193(1)(a)(2) is
inconsistent with § 48.193(1)(a)(6)'s expansive reach.
In contrast, narrow-interpretation courts have reasoned that the broad
interpretation violates canons of statutory interpretation as it renders
§ 48.193(1)(a)(6) superfluous or redundant.1 32 Yet, the broad
interpretation does not eviscerate § 48.193(l)(a)(6). 133 First, as argued
above, § 48.193(1)(a)(6) leaves a personal jurisdiction gap where any
nonresident defendant commits a tort outside of Florida but does not
solicit, engage in a service, or make or service a product used or consumed
in Florida; thus, the broad interpretation does not merely replicate
§ 48.193(1)(a)(6). Second, the broad interpretation would not render
§ 48.193(1)(a)(6) unnecessary because the broad interpretation still leaves
a gap for § 48.193(1)(a)(6) to fill: Section 48.193(1)(a)(2) is limited to tortlike claims because the adjectival modifier "tortious" is used. In contrast,
§ 48.193(1)(a)(6) does not use the modifier "tortious"; the word "act"
stands alone, allowing § 48.193(l)(a)(6) to reach not only product liability
34
claims, but also claims regarding solicitation and advertisement.'

128. Id. § 48.193(l)(a)(6)(b).
129. See Gentry, supra note 95, at 357 (discussing that the legislature intended § 48.182 to
provide personal jurisdiction "in product liability suits").
130. There is no other "tortious act" provision in § 48.193. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193.
131. See id. § 48.193(1)(a)(6).
132. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) ("'As a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, courts
should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless."' (quoting Unruh v. State,
669 So. 2d 242, 245 (Fla. 1996)). Additionally, "'all parts of a statute must be read together in order
to achieve a consistent whole. Where possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions
and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another."' Romer, 710 So. 2d at 71
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control
Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted)).
133. An interpretation that renders § 48.193(1)(a)(6) superfluous and thus invalid should be
avoided. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 1, at 66-68 (noting that statutes are presumed to be
valid and "[a]n interpretation that validates outweighs one that invalidates").
134. See id. § 48.193(1)(a)(6); Nw. Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 194
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th 2003).
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D. The NarrowInterpretationis Based on FlawedReasoning
Florida's Second, Fourth, and Fifth DCAs have asserted five reasons
for why courts should narrowly interpret § 48.193(l)(a)(2).13 5 This Note

has addressed three of these reasons above. 36 The other two reasons are as
follows: First, these courts declare that the Florida Supreme Court has
already resolved this split in favor of the narrow interpretation. Second,
because courts should strictly construe Florida's long-arm statutes, they

posit that the narrow interpretation is correct.
The first reason is erroneous. The Florida Supreme Court has not
provided any guidance on interpreting § 48.193(1)(a(2).m The Second,
Fourth, and Fifth DCAs cite to Doe v. Thompson 8 to support their
proposition that the split has been resolved. 139 In Doe, the court affirmed

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporate
officer under the corporate shield doctrine, which prevents the state from
haling corporate officers to a forum if the officer's only contacts with the
135. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has set out these reasons coherently and concisely in
a concurrence. See Romer, 710 So. 2d at 70-71 (Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting). This Note
will assume the Second and Fifth Districts also assert these reasons. But this Note will only cite to
Romer because the Second and Fifth Districts do not articulate their reasoning in detail. See, e.g.,
Freedom Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Ormandy & Assocs., Inc., 479 So. 2d 316, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
5th 1985) (providing no reasoning for why § 48.193(1)(a)(2) should be interpreted narrowly).
136. First, these courts reason that § 48.193(l)(a)(2)'s plain meaning precludes the broad
interpretation. See Romer, 710 So. 2d at 71. However, as shown above, it is improper to read
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2) plainly because "tortious act" is a legal term-of-art with a technical meaning that
supports the broad interpretation. See supra Section III.A. Second, the narrow courts have argued
that the legislative intent behind § 48.193(l)(a)(2) points to the narrow interpretation. See Romer,
710 So. 2d at 71. Yet, the drafters of § 48.193(1)(a)(2) left us with no clear evidence pointing to the
narrow interpretation. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Absent clear intent to the
contrary, the broad interpretation should control because the narrow interpretation extends
excessive due process protection to defendants. See supra Section III.B. Third, these courts reason
that the broad interpretation violates canons of statutory interpretation by eviscerating
§ 48.193(l)(a)(6). See Romer, 710 So. 2d at 71. However, while § 48.193(1)(a)(2) and (1)(a)(6)
may overlap, both provisions leave personal jurisdiction gaps that need to be filled by the other. See
supra Section III.C.
137. The Eleventh Circuit has pointed out the split and its predetermined acceptance of the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation if it ever issued. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d
1209, 1216-17 (11 th Cir. 1999). However, the Florida Supreme Court will probably not address
this issue. See infra Part IV (noting the Court has denied certification to two cases that presented
the issue and thus a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit is improper).
138. 620 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1993); see also 41 FLA. JUR. 2D PROCESS § 41 (2011) (erroneously
citing Doe for the proposition that "the occurrence of an injury within the state is insufficient in
itself to bring a defendant within the statute; some part of the tortious conduct must occur in
Florida").
139. E.g., Romer, 710 So. 2d at 70 (Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that courts
like the First and Third DCA misread Doe and that Doe foreclosed any chance of in-state injury
alone being enough to satisfy § 48.193(1)(a)(2) as the "intentional tort rationale" did not survive
Doe).
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forum are acts that solely benefited the corporation. 140 By applying the
corporate shield doctrine, the Doe court held that the nonresident defendant
"did not personally do anything in Florida: he did not
personally...
commit a tortious act in Florida, or cause injury in
' 'I4 1
Florida.

In adopting this application of the corporate shield doctrine, the Florida
Supreme Court overruled the First DCA's decision in International
Harvester Co. v. Mann. 142 However, the Florida Supreme Court did not
address InternationalHarvester'sapplication of the broad interpretation;
rather, it overruled International Harvester's misapplication of the
corporate shield doctrine. 143 Further, in a recent opinion, the Florida
Supreme Court acknowledged the split's continued existence, but did not
144 Finally, the Court denied certification to a Third DCA case
resolve it.
that upheld the broad interpretation, 145 which only shows the Court's
reluctance to address the issue.
Implicit in the argument that the split has already been resolved is that
the Florida Supreme Court has rejected the broad interpretation by not
interpreting § 48.193 to the limits of due process. However this view fails
to grasp how courts should apply the two-step process. 14 The first step
turns on whether the defendant's actions meet any of the long-arm statute's
enumerated acts. 147 The second step turns on whether personal jurisdiction
is constitutional. 148 When interpreting an enumerated-act statute in two
steps, "the inescapable conclusion [is] that an enumerated-acts long-arm
statute should be interpreted
by its own terms," rather than with a
14 9
constitutional gloss.
140. Doe, 620 So. 2d at 1006.
141. Id.
142. 460 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1984).
143. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1217 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999); Robinson v.
Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253,257 (1 th Cir. 1996). At least one court embracing the narrow
interpretation has acknowledged that the Doe court did not adopt the narrow interpretation. See
Homeway Furniture Co. of Mount Airy, Inc. v. Home, 822 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d
2002) (noting that Doe "disapproved [InternationalHarvester] on other grounds").
144. See Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201, 1206 n.6 (Fla. 2010) ("We do
not decide the broader issue of whether injury alone satisfies the requirement of section
48.193 [(1)(a)(2)]. We do recognize that the federal courts have adopted this broad construction of
section 48.193[(l)(a)(2)] ....");see also Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1253 n.2 (Fla.
2002) (noting the split).
145. See, e.g., Allerton v. Dep't of Ins., 639 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1994) (denying certification of
Allerton v. Dep't of Ins., 635 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1994), about a year after Doe was
decided).
146. See McFarland, supra note 59, at 538-40 (arguing that enumerated-act statutes should be
interpreted in two steps).
147. See Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais 554 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 1989).
148. See id.
149. McFarland, supra note 59, at 538 (emphasis added).
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Finally, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth DCAs have reasoned that the
narrow interpretation controls because Florida long-arm statutes are
"strictly construed, and the person invoking jurisdiction... has the burden
of proving
facts which clearly justify the use of that method of service of
process.'r5° Florida's federal courts' 1 and DCAs 152 have held that personal
jurisdiction statutes are strictly construed. However, numerous Florida
courts have adopted the broad interpretation despite this strict-construction
rule. In addition, there is no need to provide nonresident defendants the
benefit of the doubt during this first step of analyzing personal jurisdiction;
the appropriate time to weigh a nonresident defendant's interest is during
the second step when the court considers 53whether the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the state. 1
IV. How § 48.193(1)(A)(2) SHOULD BE AMENDED
The Florida Supreme Court has already denied certification to two cases
addressing the split over the interpretation of § 48.193(1)(a)(2).' 54 Because
the state's highest court has denied certification to cases presenting the
split, it would be improper for the Eleventh Circuit to certify a question on
the issue.155 Therefore, acknowledgement of the split's ongoing existence
156
may be all the attention the Florida Supreme Court will grant the issue.
In 2013, the Florida Legislature missed a chance (or perhaps passed on
the chance) to address the interpretative issue when it renumbered § 48.193
but did not modify § 48.193(1)(a)(2)'s language. 157 The legislature should
150. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Romer, 710 So. 2d 67, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1998)
(Farmer, J., concurring and dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Clausen, supra note 53, at 513
(arguing for the narrow interpretation as Florida's long-arm statutes are to be narrowly construed).
151. See Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11 th Cir. 1996) (holding
Florida's long-arm statute shall be strictly construed).
152. See, e.g., Bank of Wessington v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., 361 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 4th 1978) ("[Llong arm statutes are to be strictly construed; the person invoking
jurisdiction under such statutes has the burden of proving facts which clearly justify the use of this
method of service of process.").
153. See, e.g., Bookman v. KAH Inc., 614 So. 2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1993)
(setting out the second step and stating that nonresident defendants "must have certain minimum
contacts with Florida such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions offair
play and substantial justice" and that "[i]t is essential that there be some act by which the
defendants purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of conducting activities in Florida, thus
reaping the benefit and protection of its laws").
154. See Allerton v. State Dept. of Ins. 635 So. 2d 36, 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st 1994)
(presenting the broad interpretation), rev. denied, 639 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 1994); Phillips v. Orange
Co., 522 So. 2d 64, 66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d 1988) (presenting the narrow interpretation), rev.
denied, 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988).
155. See Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1217 n.8 (11 th Cir. 1999) (discussing whya
certified question to the Florida Supreme Court would be inappropriate as the Court has already
denied certification of two cases that raised the issue).
156. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
157. See 2013 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2013-164 (C.S.S.B. 186) (West).
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resolve the split by amending the provision to clearly confer jurisdiction
when acts outside of Florida cause harm to persons or property in
Florida. 158 Therefore, to ensure clarity, the Florida Legislature should
couple "tortious" with "injury," and use two restrictive clauses to replace
§ 48.193(1)(a)(2)'s current language with the following: "Committing an
act or omission, inside or outside of Florida, that causes tortious injury, in
Florida, to persons or property."' 159 The first restrictive clause, "inside or
outside of Florida," restricts the phrase "committing an act or omission,"
thus clarifying that the tort's act element can occur inside or outside of the
state. The second restrictive clause, "in Florida," follows the phrase
"causes tortious injury." This placement clarifies that the tort's injury
element must occur in Florida. Also, the provision should keep the gerund
"committing" in the interest of consistency, as most of § 48.193's specific
jurisdiction provisions use similar gerunds.160 The proposed language
clearly codifies the broad interpretation of § 48.193(1)(a)(2).
CONCLUSION

Florida courts have split on the correct interpretation of "committing a
tortious act within this state." Along with § 48.193(1)(a)(2)'s statutory
construction, strong policies support interpreting the provision broadly.
First, enumerated-act statutes should provide a state's residents and
businesses with a proper forum to redress their harms. Allowing in-state
injury to suffice under § 48.193(1)(a)(2) provides a proper forum for
Florida's residents. Moreover, considering both § 48.193's expansive
nature and Florida's overall personal jurisdiction statutory structure, the
narrow interpretation is too constricted.
Because the split creates uncertainty for nonresident defendants about
whether Florida can assert personal jurisdiction over them for their out-ofstate acts, resolving this issue is important.' 61 Moreover, the split
encourages plaintiffs to forum shop to avoid the Second, Fourth, and Fifth
158. For example, Ohio's long-ann statute confers jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by
their "[c]ausing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state." Ono REV.
CODE ANN. § 2307.382(6) (West 2013).
159. This Note does not address whether the phrase "outside of Florida" includes foreign
countries. See, e.g., Oriental Imports & Exports, Inc. v. Maduro & Curiel's Bank, N.V., 701 F.2d
889, 894 (11 th Cir. 1983) (denying personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the
alleged actions occurred in the Netherlands).
160. See FLA. STAT. § 48.193(1)(a)(1)-(9) (2013) (using various gerunds not limited to the
following: operating, conducting, owning, engaging, contracting, using, and entering). "A gerund is
a word consisting of a verb + ing" and "functions as a noun." DEBORAH CUPPLES & MARGARET
TEMPLE-SMITH, GRAMMAR, PUNCTUATION, AND STYLE: A QUICK GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND OTHER
WRITERS 11 (2013).

161. The split undermines an important advantage of enumerated-act statutes: Providing
nonresidents with notice of which acts will permit a state to assert personal jurisdiction over them.
See McFarland, supra note 59, at 532.
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DCAs. Given its denial of certification, the Florida Supreme Court is not
the proper authoritative body to remedy this issue. Therefore, the Florida
Legislature should redraft § 48.193(1)(a)(2) of the Florida Statutes to
confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who act outside of Florida
but cause harm in Florida.
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